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Academic work is publicly and correctly viewed as having a sacred quality 
involving the pursuit and transmission of truth.  But it also involves a job or 
career carried out in a competitive milieu where the usual human virtues and 
vices are never far from the surface. 
 —Gary Marx1 
And I think a lot of it has to do with how you aim the work that you’re doing, 
and if you don’t aim it at all, if you’re just throwing chickens out the window, 
then I think in some ways you’re making art.  Because if it’s more important to 
you to say something, even if that something is convoluted and hard to 
understand, than it is to attract something, or to sell something, then I think you 
might be making art. 
 —Jason Isbell2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a legal academic at the beginning of her career.  She has taken a 
job at a law school of no great renown in an unfamiliar city, remote from her 
family and friends.  As she begins her career, what should guide her?  As she 
begins to chart her trajectory as a scholar, what constitute proper motivations? 
What is best regarded as out-of-bounds?  Do the answers change after she 
receives tenure and passes through the middle and later stages of her career?  
Do the questions change? 
 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Marquette University Law School.  
Many thanks to Steve Eagle, Brian Frye, Charlie Geyh, Elisabeth Lambert, Alan Madry, Laura 
Pedersen, Jack Preis, Ryan Scoville, Amanda Seligman, and Spencer Waller for their valuable 
comments on earlier drafts. 
1. Gary T. Marx, Reflections on Academic Success and Failure: Making It, Forsaking It, 
Reshaping It, in AUTHORS OF THEIR OWN LIVES 260, 260 (B. Berger ed., 1990). 
2. The Editors of GQ Style, Watch Jason Isbell Meet George Saunders and Have an Epic 
Conversation, GQ STYLE (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.gq.com/story/jason-isbell-george-saunders-in-
conversation [https://perma.cc/NL4R-7XUR]. 
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As a descriptive account of the present state of play, it seems accurate to 
suggest that she can, without running afoul of existing norms, take into account 
matters pertinent to the advancement of her career, perhaps especially in its 
early years.  Most of her colleagues would regard it as unremarkable for her to 
want to move to a different law school—one that has a better reputation, or that 
better suits her geographic preferences, or both.  It will consequently be 
appropriate for her to be strategic in building a scholarly reputation and persona.  
She will be attentive to the placement of her scholarship, will attend 
conferences at which she can network with (she hopes) the right people, and 
will seek out and endeavor to follow advice on building a scholarly reputation.  
She will attempt more generally to attract the favorable notice of those who 
might help her to realize her goals, which are regarded as legitimate ends in 
themselves. 
She might have other motivations as well.  She may be a deeply committed 
partisan on some set of issues (whether in the political sense of the word or 
otherwise), and seek to influence the nature of the debate and course of the law.  
She may seek a reputation for its own sake, because it is rewarding to be held 
in high esteem by one’s professional peers, or because of the various trappings 
that come along with such a reputation – acolytes and invitations and being part 
of an “in” crowd and so on.  Her goal might be to increase the store of 
knowledge.  Or perhaps to explore difficult questions simply for the sake of 
doing so.  She may be thinking about nothing more than doing what is required 
to get tenure, or to secure a few thousand dollars in summer research funding.  
She may welcome other ways to supplement her income and thus be attempting 
to position herself to secure consulting work. 
All of these things, it seems clear, are motivations that one can find among 
legal academics collectively, and to varying degrees within legal academics 
individually.  Not all of them, I will suggest, are laudable or even appropriate.  
In doing so, I mean to make no claims to personal immunity from them or to 
having traveled exclusively along any sort of high road.  But I have often felt 
uneasy about what I have seen, and sometimes about what I have done, and 
have wondered about the nature of the prize that, as the saying has it, I’ve 
attempted to keep my eye on.  And so it seems appropriate to consider which 
of the things mentioned above (a list that I don’t imagine to be comprehensive) 
ought to be regarded as proper goals for a legal academic, or at least to attempt 
to provide some sort of framework for thinking about such questions.   
This, then, is an essay about scholarly motivation.  What is it that motivates 
the production of scholarship?  What ought to motivate it?  To what extent do 
the answers to those questions overlap?  How and to what extent does 
motivation count in determining whether something is scholarship, and whether 
a member of the academy is acting in an appropriately scholarly manner?  What 
OLDFATHER 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/18  10:08 AM 
2018] THE SCHOLAR'S DILEMMA 959 
are the implications for academic freedom and the role of the scholar within a 
university?  How closely are questions of motivation related to questions 
regarding the proper purposes of scholarship?  Might some sorts of motivations 
be thought better simply because the scholar who possesses them is more likely 
to continue to fulfill her obligation to be a scholar over the course of her 
academic career? 
In academia, as in most facets of life, there are ideals and there is reality.  
In the world of the ideal, the scholar is, as Emerson put it, “Man Thinking,”3 
who “plies the slow, unhonored, and unpaid task of observation.”4  “But he, in 
his private observatory, cataloguing obscure and nebulous stars of the human 
mind, which as yet no man has thought of as such,—watching days and months, 
sometimes, for a few facts; correcting still his old records;—must relinquish 
display and immediate fame.”5  He is to be indifferent to money, to power, and 
to popular opinion.  His motivation is purely internal, and he is a scholar 
because he cannot help himself.  He shall be “happy enough, if he can satisfy 
himself alone, that this day he has seen something truly.”6 
Reality, at least as it stands some 180 years after Emerson’s address, is 
considerably messier.  Scholars face a choice akin to that often discussed by 
artists, and must similarly choose a path between often-conflicting sets of 
considerations.  At one extreme, we can stay true to our craft, pursuing the 
questions that interest us and following our muses wherever they happen to take 
us without regard to whether we expect that doing so will play well with any 
particular audience over the short- or long-term.  We can emphasize the 
pleasures of engaging in scholarly inquiry over the results it might bring.  
Toward the other, we might focus on more immediate indicators of impact in 
pursuit of academia’s version of fame and fortune.  It is perhaps even possible, 
to invoke the pejorative phrase for the latter option, for an academic to “sell 
out.” 
These are not questions with easy or precise answers, due in large part to 
the nature of the enterprise.  I stand with those who regard scholarship as a 
“practice” in Alasdair MacIntyre’s sense of the word,7 a “coherent and complex 
form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
 
3. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The American Scholar, in ESSAYS AND LECTURES 51, 54 (1983). 
4. Id. at 63. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 64. 
7. E.g., STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO 
REVOLUTION 63 (2014). 
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those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive 
of, that form of activity.”8  It thus does not exist as something fixed and 
determinate, but rather is more akin to an organism the shape and growth of 
which are products of the larger social, cultural, and institutional contexts in 
which it takes place.  While we thus may not be able to isolate specific 
prescriptions, we can hope to identify the appropriate considerations to take 
into account in thinking about the nature and role of scholarly motivation, and 
thus to shape the practice in which we are engaged. 
My goal in this Essay is accordingly to consider these questions at a fairly 
high level of abstraction, and in a necessarily preliminary way.  One of its 
premises is that artists—broadly defined—face a similar set of choices.  
Because artists have devoted more time to considering these questions than 
scholars, I use their efforts as a point of departure for a consideration of 
scholarly motivation and its relationship to the role of universities and scholars.  
The contexts of art and scholarship do not exactly parallel one another, of 
course, and it may well be that doing scholarship well necessarily entails taming 
or at least channeling one’s muse in a way that art does not.  But the contrast 
between them helps to highlight some of the tensions in the scholar’s role, and 
the various motivations that can pull his or her motivations off true north. 
II. THE ARTIST’S DILEMMA 
“[T]o thine own self be true” stands among the most quoted of 
Shakespeare’s writings,9 and its popularity suggests that concerns about 
authenticity are not confined to any subset of people.  Each of us no doubt feels 
some core concept of who we are, and each of us likewise prefers to act in ways 
that are consistent with that self-concept.  The former student activist who finds 
herself “working for the Man” must grapple with the disconnect, as must 
anyone who lands in circumstances in which they feel they must stifle some 
portion of who they “really” are.10  In Eleanor Roosevelt’s prescription, “[t]he 
standards by which you live must be your own standards, your own values, your 
own convictions in regard to what is right and wrong.”11  This requires a certain 
isolation.  “When you adopt the standards and the values of someone else or a 
community or a pressure group, you surrender your own integrity.  You 
 
8. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 187 (3d ed. 2007). 
9. See Chris Wilson, Here are Shakespeare’s 15 Most Beloved Quotes, TIME (April 21, 2016), 
http://time.com/4299219/william-shakespeare-plays-quotes-kindle/ [http://perma.cc/Q5ZE-DPMY]. 
10. For a pop-psychological discussion, see Stephen Joseph, To Thine Own Self Be True, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (April 11, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/what-doesnt-kill-
us/201304/thine-own-self-be-true [https://perma.cc/SM9W-Z6VN]. 
11. ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, YOU LEARN BY LIVING 111 (1960). 
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become, to the extent of your surrender, less of a human being.”12  It is a species 
of the more general human discontent discussed by H.L. Mencken: 
The great majority of us—all, in brief, who are normal—pass 
through life in constant revolt against our limitations, objective 
and subjective.  Our conscious thought is largely devoted to 
plans and specifications for cutting a better figure in human 
society, and in our unconscious the business goes on much 
more steadily and powerfully.  No healthy man, in his secret 
heart, is content with his destiny.  He is tortured by dreams and 
images as a child is tortured by the thought of a state of 
existence in which it would live in a candy-store and have two 
stomachs.13 
Feelings of inauthenticity, the struggle against the forces and limitations 
that thwart the expression of our authentic selves, and the desire to remain true 
to one’s vision regardless of the consequences are of course the subject of a 
great deal of art.  And whether it is truly a special case, or simply felt more 
deeply and perhaps better articulated, artists (broadly defined) themselves often 
address these questions.  Perhaps, as James Baldwin suggested, “the artist’s 
struggle for his integrity must be considered as a kind of metaphor for the 
struggle, which is universal and daily, of all human beings on the face of this 
globe to get to become human beings.”14  Here, too, there is an ideal and there 
is reality.  In the ideal the artist relentlessly pursues a vision, heedless of 
whether the world is paying attention.  He, like the protagonist in Kris 
Kristofferson’s To Beat the Devil, persists through hunger and rejection (and 
perhaps a face-to-face conversation with Satan himself) to express the things 
he feels compelled to express: 
I was born a lonely singer 
And I’m bound to die the same 
But I’ve got to feed the hunger in my soul 
And if I never have a nickel 
I won’t ever die ashamed 
‘Cause I don’t believe that no one wants to know15 
 
12. Id. 
13. H.L. MENCKEN, The Art Eternal, in A MENCKEN CHRESTOMATHY 325 (1956).  Roosevelt 
again: “But the worst threat comes from within, from a man’s or a woman’s apathy, his willingness to 
surrender to pressure, to ‘do it the easy way,’ to give up the one thing that is himself, his value and his 
meaning as a person—his individuality.”  ROOSEVELT, supra note 11, at 111. 
14. JAMES BALDWIN, The Artist’s Struggle for Integrity, in THE CROSS OF REDEMPTION: 
UNCOLLECTED WRITINGS 50, 50–51 (Randall Kenan ed., 2010). 
15. KRIS KRISTOFFERSON, To Beat the Devil, on KRISTOFFERSON (Monument Records 1970). 
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He may, along with George Saunders, have “comically, comically high levels 
of ambition,”16 and he may aspire to something beyond simply entertaining 
people to instead creating something of lasting value.  But he of course also has 
to eat, and clothe himself, and pay the rent.17  He might sometimes wish to do 
these things at something beyond a minimal level.  He is likely, at some point, 
to ask himself why he does what he does.18 
The abstract expressionist painter Mark Rothko, in an essay entitled The 
Artist’s Dilemma,19 addressed questions of inspiration and motivation and the 
societal constraints under which an artist may labor.  Rothko reflects first on 
artists of the past, who lived in “dogmatic societies” in which “society is 
allowed only one Official Truth.  The demands made upon the artist, therefore, 
issued from a single source, and the specifications for art were definite and 
unmistakable.”20  But: “The Law of Authority has this saving grace: it can be 
circumnavigated.  One can pay lip service to the letter and with equanimity 
violate its spirit.  One bows to necessity, then schemes to defeat it.”21 
The modern artist, though, has a choice: 
Since the passing of the spiritual and temporal patron, the 
history of art is the history of men who, for the most part, have 
preferred hunger to compliance, and who have considered the 
choice worthwhile. And choice it is, for all the tragic disparity 
between the two alternatives. 
 
16. See Editors of GQ Style, supra note 2. 
17. For an example, the story of author James Wilcox’s struggle to balance these demands, see 
James B. Stewart, Moby Dick in Manhattan, NEW YORKER, June 27, 1994, at 46, 46–48. 
18. A classic example of the genre is George Orwell’s Why I Write:   
Putting aside the need to earn a living, I think there are four great motives for 
writing, at any rate for writing prose.  They exist in different degrees in every 
writer, and in any one writer the proportions will vary from time to time, 
according to the atmosphere in which he is living.  They are:  
(1) Sheer egoism. . . .   
(2) [Ae]sthetic enthusiasm. . . .   
(3) Historical impulse. . . .   
(4) Political purpose—using the word “political” in the widest possible sense. . . .  
It can be seen how these various impulses must war against one another, and how 
they must fluctuate from person to person and from time to time. 
GEORGE ORWELL, Why I Write, GANGREL (1946), reprinted in A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 313, 315–
316 (Sonia Brown Orwell ed., Harcourt, Brace, and Co., Inc. 1953).  Joan Didion’s answer to the 
question is more personal: “[I] write entirely to find out what I’m thinking, what I’m looking at, wh[a]t 
I see and what it means.  What [I] want and what I fear.”  Joan Didion, Why I Write, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
5, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/12/05/archives/why-i-write-why-i-write.html 
[http://perma.cc/U3QW-G5SP]. 
19. MARK ROTHKO, The Artist’s Dilemma, in THE ARTIST’S REALITY: PHILOSOPHIES OF ART 
(Christopher Rothko ed., 2004). 
20. Id. at 4. 
21. Id. 
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The freedom to starve!  Ironical indeed.  Yet hold your 
laughter.  Do not underestimate the privilege.  It is seldom 
possessed, and dearly won. . . . Concerning hunger, as 
concerning art, society has traditionally been dogmatic.  One 
had to starve legitimately—through famine or blight, through 
unemployment or exploitation—or not at all.  One could no 
more contrive his own starvation than he could take his own 
life; and for the artist to have said to society that he would 
sooner starve than traffic with her wares or tastes would have 
been heresy and dealt with summarily as such. . . .  
But here, today, we still have the right to choose.  It is 
precisely the possibility of exercising choice wherein our lot 
differs from that of the artists of the past.  For choice implies 
responsibility to one’s conscience, and, in the conscience of the 
artist, the Truth of Art is foremost.  There may be other 
loyalties, but for the artist, unless he has been waylaid or 
distracted, they will be secondary and discarded in his creation 
of art.  This artistic conscience, which is composed of present 
reason and memory, this morality intrinsic to the generic logic 
of art itself, is inescapable.  Violate her promptings and she 
will ferret out the deepest recesses of thought and conjecture.  
Neither sophistries nor rationalizations can quiet her 
demands.22 
Rothko delivers a stern message.  The artist’s legitimate concern is with art and 
art alone.  Of course, Rothko also recognizes that the artist will have “other 
loyalties.”23  He, too, will crave affirmation, recognition, and the occasional 
nice meal.  His creative goals might not be purely artistic—that is, he might 
seek to create something that has some additional, functional purposes to it, but 
to do so in a way that nonetheless has a substantial, aesthetic or otherwise 
meaning-laden component to it.  He might simply find the processes of creation 
themselves to be satisfying, with little regard for whether the products of those 
processes are “art.”  But for Rothko, it seems, the purest, most legitimate 
motivations are intrinsic, and exist independently of whether anyone else finds 
the artist’s expression valuable, or interesting, or proper.  What he must not do, 
it seems clear, is tailor his work to the marketplace.  Fame and fortune may be 
acceptable, but only when they are incidental to the recognition of genius on its 
own terms. 
But we might ask why it matters.  Does motive make a difference, and if so 
what are the consequences of an impure motive?  If my goal is simply to 
 
22. Id. at 3–4. 
23. Id. at 4. 
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become famous, and to make a lot of money, and I happen along the way to 
create something that many people regard as “art,” then isn’t that enough?  If 
it’s not determinative, does the presence of an “impure” motive at least make it 
less likely?  Should we think less of Bob Dylan because he expressed an 
ambition “to join ‘Little Richard’” in his high school yearbook?24  Does it 
matter whether what he meant by this was an ambition to greatness versus an 
ambition to fame? 
Motivation cannot be the only thing that matters.  Someone whose 
motivations are pure might nevertheless lack talent and thus be incapable of 
producing something that we would call art, under a restrictive definition, or 
good art, under a more expansive one.  But talent, or at least not everything that 
might fit comfortably within some definition of talent, is also not determinative.  
Someone with great technical skill and a strong aesthetic sense may labor for a 
long time to create something that is not art (on most accounts), be it a concert 
poster, a McDonald’s jingle, or a romance novel, even though the ability to do 
those things successfully is undoubtedly not widely shared.  A Brillo box may 
have been a work with high aesthetic value, and perhaps even a species of art,25 
but Arthur Danto argues that only Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box—designed to look 
as much like an actual Brillo box as was possible—was art in the high culture 
sense.  Because there were no aesthetic differences, this could only be because 
of an invisible property, namely that Warhol’s boxes’ “purpose was purely to 
be seen and understood as art.”26 
 
24. John Robinson, Bob Dylan: The Hibbing High School ‘Class of 1959’ Reunion, TELEGRAPH 
(London) (July 23, 2009, 10:39 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/music/bob-
dylan/5887887/Bob-Dylan-the-Hibbing-High-School-Class-Of-1959-reunion.html 
[http://perma.cc/S9A3-C6A5]. 
25. See ARTHUR C. DANTO, WHAT ART IS 44 (2013). 
26. Id.  Warhol certainly did not subscribe to Rothko’s views about the Truth of Art, at least 
insofar as the artist faces a choice between starvation and fidelity to the truth.  As Warhol famously 
stated, “[b]eing good in business is the most fascinating kind of art.  During the hippie era people put 
down the idea of business—they’d say, ‘Money is bad,’ and ‘Working is bad,’ but making money is 
art and working is art and good business is the best art.”  ANDY WARHOL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANDY 
WARHOL 92 (1975).  Still, it seems possible to square the two views, at least insofar as we can regard 
Warhol as not motivated simply by a naked desire to become famous but rather as making what he 
regarded as sincere points about art, culture, and society.  That is a plausible interpretation.  As one 
person familiar with Warhol put it, “Andy Warhol was a serious artist whose posture was 
unseriousness.”  Richard Pearson, Andy Warhol, Pioneer of Pop Art, Dies After Heart Attack, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 23, 1987), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/style/longterm/review96/fishotandywarhol.htm [https://perma.cc/78JG-KCY8]. 
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Yet, motivation factors into only some efforts to distinguish “art” from “not 
art.”27  Functional attempts at defining art place emphasis on the creator’s 
intention.  Monroe Beardsley, for example, offered that something qualifies as 
“art” if it is “either an arrangement of conditions intended to be capable of 
affording an experience with marked aesthetic character or (incidentally) an 
arrangement belonging to a class or type of arrangements that is typically 
intended to have this capacity.”28  Danto disclaims the appropriateness of an 
aesthetic component to a definition of art—because much modern art expressly 
disclaims aesthetic ambition—and offers a definition with the following two 
main components: “something is a work of art when it has a meaning—is about 
something—and when that meaning is embodied in the work—which usually 
means: is embodied in the object in which the work of art materially consists.”29  
But such a component does not feature in all definitions. 
The philosophical questions surrounding the definition of art are difficult, 
and the preceding discussion has at best merely scratched their surface.  But as 
the quotes above from Mark Rothko30 and Jason Isbell31 suggest, a sense 
persists that a creator whose motivations are impure, who seeks money or fame 
for their own sake, and whose urge simply to express himself (or, on some 
accounts, conception of the truth of art) is insufficiently predominant in his 
thinking and activity, has failed to be sufficiently authentic, and has perhaps 
even “sold out.”32  In the words of Quincy Jones, “I have never in my life made 
music for money or fame. . . .  No way.  God walks out of the room when you’re 
thinking about money.”33  Lewis Hyde distinguishes between those who labor 
in service to their creative gifts and those who deploy their gifts in service to 
 
27. See generally Thomas Adajian, The Definition of Art, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 9, 2012), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/art-definition/ [https://perma.cc/D5RP-
3P6D]. 
28. MONROE C. BEARDSLEY, Redefining Art, in THE AESTHETIC POINT OF VIEW 298, 299 
(Michael J. Wreen & Donald M. Callen eds., 1982) (emphasis omitted). 
29. DANTO, supra note 25, at 149. 
30. See supra notes 19–22. 
31. See Editors of GQ Style, supra note 2. 
32. Jennifer Egan has noted the tension and the temptations: 
The attention and approval I’ve been getting for Goon Squad—the very public 
moments of winning the Pulitzer and the other prizes—is exactly the opposite of 
the very private pleasure of writing.  And it’s dangerous.  Thinking that I’ll get 
this kind of love again, that getting it should be my goal, would lead me to creative 
decisions that would undermine me and my work.  I’ve never sought that 
approval, which is all the more reason that I don’t want to start now. 
Jennifer Egan, Jennifer Egan, in WHY WE WRITE: 20 ACCLAIMED AUTHORS ON HOW AND WHY THEY 
DO WHAT THEY DO 25, 33–34 (Meredith Maran ed., 2013). 
33. David Marchese, In Conversation: Quincy Jones, VULTURE (Feb. 7, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.vulture.com/2018/02/quincy-jones-in-conversation.html [https://perma.cc/D82N-3586]. 
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themselves, who he labels as narcissists.  “The narcissist feels his gifts come 
from himself.  He works to display himself, not to suffer change. . . . The 
celebrity trades on his gifts, he does not sacrifice to them.”34  These are not 
suggestions that an artist must be deadly serious, or cannot poke fun at pieties 
or choose unconventional means of expression.  Just that if she does any of it 
simply to become famous, or simply to earn money, and without a sufficiently 
strong desire to sincerely express herself, then she might be an entertainer rather 
than an artist, and what she creates might be something less than art. 
III. THE SCHOLAR’S DILEMMA 
One of my premises, of course, is that there is a fundamental similarity 
between the position of the academic and that of the artist.  Each works in the 
shadow of an idealized conception of the role, in which the activity is guided 
entirely by some pure, overarching pursuit, in both cases reducible to concepts 
like “truth.”  Practitioners of each likewise work subject to potential corrupting 
influences.  For the artist and scholar alike ambition stands as a perhaps 
necessary predicate to success and a force susceptible to misdirection.  Both 
endeavors present what are perhaps merely special cases of the more general 
human struggles associated with the tensions between immediate and delayed 
gratification. 
So conceived, it is easy to imagine the scholar’s role as parallel to that of 
the artist’s, and many sophisticated discussions proceed from a conception of 
the role that is consistent with such a vision.  Thus, for example, the AAUP’s 
1915 Declaration on Principles of Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure—
which one scholar characterized as “the single most important document on 
academic freedom in the United States”35—places the role of the scholar in 
clear opposition to influence by “pecuniary emoluments.”36  Instead, the 
AAUP’s Declaration continues, the function of those called to academia 
is to deal at first hand, after prolonged and specialized technical 
training, with the sources of knowledge; and to impart the 
results of their own and of their fellow-specialists’ 
investigation and reflection, both to students and to the general 
public, without fear or favor.  The proper discharge of this 
function requires (among other things) that the university 
teacher shall be exempt from any pecuniary motive or 
 
34. LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT: CREATIVITY AND THE ARTIST IN THE MODERN WORLD 68 (2007). 
35. J. Peter Byrne, The Social Value of Academic Freedom Defended, 91 INDIANA L.J. 5, 5–6 
(2015). 
36.  AAUP, 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC 
TENURE (1915), https://aaup.org.uiowa.edu/aaup-principles [https://perma.cc/Q4UE-9W9B] 
[hereinafter AAUP 1915]. 
OLDFATHER 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/18  10:08 AM 
2018] THE SCHOLAR'S DILEMMA 967 
inducement to hold, or to express, any conclusion which is not 
the genuine and uncolored product of his own study or that of 
fellow specialists. . . . To the degree that professional 
scholars, in the formation and promulgation of their opinions, 
are, or by the character of their tenure appear to be, subject to 
any motive other than their own scientific conscience and a 
desire for the respect of their fellow-experts, to that degree the 
university teaching profession is corrupted; its proper 
influence upon public opinion is diminished and vitiated; and 
society at large fails to get from its scholars, in an 
unadulterated form, the peculiar and necessary service which 
it is the office of the professional scholar to furnish.37 
This entails something akin to Rothko’s allegiance to the “Truth of Art.”   
The liberty of the scholar within the university to set forth his 
conclusions, be they what they may, is conditioned by their 
being conclusions gained by a scholar’s method and held in a 
scholar’s spirit; that is to say, they must be the fruits of 
competent and patient and sincere inquiry, and they should be 
set forth with dignity, courtesy, and temperateness of 
language.38 
C. Wright Mills admonished beginning students “that the most admirable 
thinkers within the scholarly community you have chosen to join do not split 
their work from their lives.”39  Instead, 
[s]cholarship is a choice of how to live as well as a choice of 
career; whether he knows it or not, the intellectual workman 
forms his own self as he works toward the perfection of his 
craft; to realize his own potentialities, and any opportunities 
that come his way, he constructs a character which has as its 
core the qualities of the good workman.40 
Yet much of the value of comparative inquiry lies in the identification and 
study of difference.41  The artist’s and scholar’s dilemmas are not identical, 
because the contexts in which the artist and the scholar work (and the materials 
with which they work) are not identical.  Both have an ultimate loyalty to 
truth.42  But even here there is a subtle but significant distinction.  The artist’s 
 
37. Id. (emphasis added). 
38. Id. (emphasis added). 
39. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION app. at 195 (1959). 
40. Id. at 196. 
41. “The hardest thing in the world is to study one object; when you try to contrast objects, you 
get a better grip on the materials and you can then sort out the dimensions in terms of which the 
comparisons are made.”  Id. at 214. 
42. I assume a somewhat expansive conception of truth here. 
 
OLDFATHER 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/18  10:08 AM 
968 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:957 
mission, as Rothko sets it up, is to further truth as he or she defines it.43  The 
artist is to be guided by his light and only his light.  The scholar’s truth, in 
contrast, is a shared truth.  He is to follow his own light, but do so to explore 
the shadows cast in places where others’ light has not yet reached. 
This distinction manifests itself in the processes of becoming.  The path to 
becoming an artist certainly can involve education and immersion in a tradition, 
but it need not.  It is easy to imagine someone who merits the label “artist” but 
who was not formally trained in her discipline, including a great many writers 
and musicians, and even some celebrated painters such as Henri Rousseau.44  
An artist, then, can develop a perspective or style that is disconnected from any 
identified school of thought, or that consciously chooses to reject them.  And 
while it is undoubtedly the case that no one can stand outside his or her own 
culture and create art that is somehow not a product of that culture’s fashions 
and assumptions, the fact that museums display items created by people who 
lived in cultures very different from our own at least suggests the possibility 
that “art” and “culture” are not necessarily interconnected.45 
To be a scholar, in contrast, is necessarily to be part of a community, and 
membership in that community requires formal training in which the 
prospective member absorbs substantive and methodological knowledge and 
internalizes the norms of a discipline.  The 1915 AAUP Declaration, as 
characterized by Stanley Fish, conceives of academics as professionals “called 
to a vocation,” who “must undergo a rigorous and lengthy period of training.”46  
More than that: “Being a professional is less a matter of specific performance 
(although specific performances are required) than of a continual, indeed 
lifelong, responsiveness to an ideal or spirit.”47   
Scholarship is thus an inherently communal practice.  Art may transcend 
culture, or at least be limited only by culture’s broadest constraints.  Scholarly 
disciplines, in contrast, exist because of and subject to some more narrowly 
 
43. ROTHKO, supra note 19, at 4. 
44. Id. at 115. 
45. Institutionalist theories of art provide a definition of art that, if accepted, would further bridge 
the gap between art and scholarship.  On an institutionalist view,  
determining what is art is altogether a matter to be decided by . . . the Art World, 
which . . . is a sort of social network, consisting of curators, collectors, art critics, 
artists (of course), and others whose life is connected to art in some way.  
Something is a work of art, then, if the Art World decrees that it is. 
DANTO, supra note 25, at 33. 
46. FISH, supra note 7, at 3.  As applied to the training required to become a legal academic, one 
might of course wish to add “(sic)” at the end of the quote. 
47. Id. 
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held set of shared norms.  Robert Post contrasts art and humanities scholarship 
as follows: 
Insofar as humanities scholarship is disciplinary, therefore, it 
cannot be inherently “subversive” or “intrinsically 
revolutionary.”  To imagine humanities scholarship as 
promiscuously unsettling is to endow it with a form of 
authority that is more like that of art than like that of a 
discipline.  Artistic authority can be inherently subversive and 
intrinsically revolutionary because artistic success does not 
appear to depend upon either reproducible methodological 
competence or the approval of established organizations like 
universities.48 
Because what counts as good scholarship cannot be assessed except by 
reference to contemporary norms of scholarship, it is impossible for a scholar 
to create good scholarship in a vacuum.  Topic selection, the selection and 
implementation of methodology, and the execution and assessment thereof are 
tied to this intangible communal conception of what falls within the appropriate 
range of the discipline.  This is especially so in a field like law, where the object 
of study is not something that exists in the world in the way that the laws of 
physics do, but rather exists as a social product.  (It is in this sense at least 
superficially distinct from science, as to which someone pursuing her own 
esoteric agenda might make a discovery the usefulness of which will be 
demonstrable on its own terms.)49 
It is thus proper—indeed inescapable—for a scholar who wishes to produce 
excellent scholarship to be mindful of the norms of the larger academic 
 
48. Robert Post, Debating Disciplinarity, 35 CRITICAL INQUIRY 749, 760–61 (2009) (citation 
omitted). 
49. Some readers of a draft of this Essay suggested a potential tension between the vision of 
scholarly activity implicit in my analysis and that embodied in Thomas Kuhn’s analysis of scientific 
revolutions.  THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).  My 
sense is that Kuhn’s model provides, at best, an imperfect template for the analysis of change in either 
legal doctrine or legal theory, and that legal theory in particular exhibits many of the characteristics 
that Kuhn associates with pre-paradigm science.  Id. at 13, 15.  In a pre-paradigm world, as in the world 
of legal scholarship, there are “frequent and deep debates over legitimate methods, problems, and 
standards of solution, though these serve to define schools than to produce agreement.”  Id. at 47–48.  
Kuhn himself is careful not to claim too broad a scope for his analysis.  E.g., id. at 19 (distinguishing 
the rise of specialization in science from that “in fields like medicine, technology, and law, of which 
the principle raison d’etre is an external social need”).  To be sure, there is plenty of legal scholarship 
that takes one or the other of the available schools of thought as a paradigm and proceeds to undertake 
something that closely resembles Kuhnian “normal science.”  Id. at 23–24.  But there is also a great 
deal of work, and it tends to be among the most celebrated, that expressly aims at the production of 
novelty rather than at the production of results consistent with an existing paradigm.  My sense is that 
disciplinary norms in law tend to evolve as much through the sort of collective drift associated with 
changes in fashion as through the sort of punctuated breaks identified by Kuhn. 
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community of which he is a part, and to appeal to and attempt to satisfy those 
norms to the highest and fullest extent, including by striving to build a 
reputation among members of that community as a good scholar, because there 
is no other way to measure the quality of scholarship.  This is by no means a 
negative feature, and participation in such a community can itself provide a 
strong source of professional satisfaction.50  Yet it means that even a scholar 
whose efforts to break new ground involve challenging accepted wisdom must 
at some level proceed from shared premises.  A scholar who rejects all or even 
most of such premises opens himself to the charge that he is no longer practicing 
the discipline.51 
There is a second set of audiences a scholar must be aware of, if not oriented 
toward.  These exist beyond the university gate.  The academic freedom faculty 
members enjoy is, on most accounts,52 a product of one of the university’s core 
social functions, which is the advancement of knowledge and pursuit of truth.53  
Indeed, the 1915 Declaration places the university teacher’s responsibility “to 
the public itself” on the same plane as “the judgment of his own profession.”54  
Even Emerson’s Man Thinking acts not simply for himself: “The office of the 
scholar is to cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them facts amidst 
appearances.”55   
Disciplinary knowledge provides society its most reliable pool 
of knowledge about the natural and social world.  I cannot 
determine whether smoking causes cancer by looking at 
cigarettes; I need to rely on the tested inquiries of scientists.  
This is true even though, and even because, disciplinary 
knowledge remains subject to critique and revision.  The 
capacity of the university to generate such reliable knowledge 
 
50. Mary Kay Kane, Some Thoughts on Scholarship for Beginning Teachers, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
14, 19 (1987) (“You will find that through your writing others get to know you and you can become 
involved in a sophisticated dialogue with those who are interested in the very subjects dearest to your 
heart. . . . We law teachers are a small community, and there is nothing more rewarding than 
participating in the continual exchange of ideas that is the life blood of our community.”); see also 
James Boyd White, Why I Write, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1021, 1037 (1996) (“I write out of my 
experience, including my reading, to others who reflect on their experience and may find my reflections 
of value.”). 
51. This is, more or less, the point that Paul Carrington made against Critical Legal Studies in 
Of Law and the River.  Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227–28 
(1984) (“[T]he nihilist who must profess that legal principle does not matter has an ethical duty to 
depart the law school, perhaps to seek a place elsewhere in the academy.”). 
52. But see FISH, supra note 7, 12–13. 
53. Byrne, supra note 35, at 6; AAUP 1915, supra note 36. 
54. See AAUP 1915, supra note 36. 
55. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 63. 
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provides the basis for the social value of academic freedom.56   
Society has recently, albeit with notable exceptions, valued the fruits of this 
inquiry a great deal, providing robust protection for academic freedom on the 
understanding that the bargain justifies the production of a great deal of bad or 
useless work.57 
 The scholar, then, necessarily has significant loyalties beyond that to her 
conception of truth.  These external constituencies ideally serve as a source of 
moderation.  The search for truth must take place subject to the constraints of 
the discipline and the duty to society.  But both also serve as sources of 
potentially corrupting influences, because an inappropriately calibrated desire 
to appeal to either constituency can sway a scholar away from the search for 
truth.   
The desire to influence and otherwise be a part of the conversation within 
one’s discipline naturally leads one to shape his views to those of other 
participants.  This is, as noted above,58 desirable to the extent that it brings any 
one participant’s position to a “better” place as measured by disciplinary norms.  
But it also introduces pathologies that have the potential to draw the scholar 
away from the quest for truth and in search of more immediate and tangible 
rewards. 
Perhaps the primary pathology is the pursuit of status.  Status hierarchies 
exist throughout academia.59  And academics as a class of people are perhaps 
especially likely to embody an enhanced susceptibility to ambition and 
accompanying anxiety about the worth of their own contributions.  Scholars 
“compete in a very big league.  They measure themselves not only against each 
other but against Aristotle and . . . Kant and all the other 
immortals. . . . Whatever they publish claims room on the same shelf with the 
classics.”60  Success and the recognition that accompanies it will often turn out 
to be fleeting,61 but they are treasured, and the best measure of their existence 
 
56. Byrne, supra note 35, at 9. 
57. Id. at 16.  Of course, recent history suggests that not all state legislatures appreciate the nature 
of the bargain. 
58. See supra Part II. 
59. See Andrew Piper & Chad Wellmon, How the Academic Elite Reproduces Itself, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Washington) (October 8, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-the-
Academic-Elite/241374 [http://perma.cc/5TU6-6VSP]. 
60. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE: SCHOLARS, STATUS, AND ACADEMIC 
CULTURE 13 (2006) (first alteration in original) (quoting GERALD BRACE WARNER, THE 
DEPARTMENT 280 (1968)). 
61. Id. at 13; Marx, supra note 1, at 260. 
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is the approval of those higher up the food chain.62  “In a world in which 
financial compensation and opportunities for advancement are highly 
constrained, smaller emblems of status become increasingly critical.  Awards, 
speaking invitations, titles, publications in prominent journals, and references 
by scholars and media commentators all become coveted signals of success.”63 
This dynamic seems especially acute in legal academia.64  Though hiring 
practices may be slightly less dominated by pure credentialism than in the past, 
legal academia as a whole seems content to disregard the notion that “past 
performance does not guarantee future results” as well as readily available 
lessons from elsewhere in the world suggesting that early promise often does 
not pan out, while late developers and those otherwise overlooked in the early 
stages of talent scouting often attain great success.65  Whether as a byproduct 
or simply a continuation of this underlying phenomenon we remain obsessed 
with measuring our relative status—via law school rankings, citation rankings, 
download counts, and the like.  Kenneth Lasson contends that “for many a law 
professor image is easily as important as substance.”66  As Gary Marx observes 
in a footnote to the text quoted in the epigraph, such concerns are perhaps 
unsurprising given law’s methodological uncertainty.67  Whatever the cause, 
 
62. John Henry Schlegel, A Certain Narcissism; A Slight Unseemliness, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 
595, 601, 613 (1992). 
63. RHODE, supra note 60, at 11. 
64. My suspicion is that this is a product of the lack of any expectation that the path to becoming 
a legal academic involves graduate training, and the resulting lack of any sort of methodological 
uniformity.  
65. Sports provides a useful analogy.  Were we to imagine the legal academy as the National 
Football League, its current hiring practices would lead it to draft players almost entirely from 
traditional powerhouse programs—Alabama, Oklahoma, Ohio State and so on.  The players in those 
programs are by and large the players who showed the greatest early potential.  Yet in reality most of 
them end up undrafted or drafted behind players from lesser programs.  And the roster of the greatest 
players in NFL history includes a substantial number from minor college programs, such as Walter 
Payton (Jackson State), Jerry Rice (Mississippi Valley State), and Brett Favre (University of Southern 
Mississippi). 
66. Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 926, 948 (1990). 
67. Marx, supra note 1, at 280 n.2 (“One observer even suggests that academic fauna can be 
ordered according to the degree of concern shown toward the outward presentation of self. Variation 
is inversely related to a discipline’s certainty of results: ‘Thus at one end of the spectrum occupied by 
sociologists and professors of literature, where there is uncertainty as to how to discover the facts, the 
nature of the facts to be discovered, and whether indeed there are any facts at all, all attention is focused 
on one’s peers, whose regard is the sole criterion for professional success. Great pains are taken in the 
development of the impressive persona . . . .  At the other end, where, as the mathematicians 
themselves are fond of pointing out, “a proof is a proof,” no concern need be given to making oneself 
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Paul Horwitz has aptly characterized the result: “The legal academy is, truly, a 
collection of JD-carrying Lisa Simpsons.  We are never happier than when a 
gold star is being put on our papers: by our local colleagues, by professors at 
elite institutions, and even (or especially) by student law review editors at the 
‘right’ journals.”68 
The danger here is that work produced in pursuit of status, in order to be 
successful, requires a substantial degree of strategic thought and behavior.  The 
academic in search of the next invitation, award, or lateral move will behave 
differently than the scholar with no such ambitions.  The possibilities are easy 
to imagine.  He will be deliberate in what topics he chooses to pursue, and, as 
importantly, not to pursue.  He will attempt to curry favor in ways unrelated to 
his merits as a scholar or teacher.  He may devote less effort to creating a quality 
product and more to building a positive brand.  In doing this he will be guided 
by things other than his conception of the truth. 
There is also a risk that scholars will allow forces external to the academy 
to exert inappropriate influence on their work.  To a degree, such influence is 
unavoidable.  Scholars live embedded in a specific place and time, and naturally 
carry with them most of the prejudices of that place and time.  But they may 
also be susceptible to other influences, with politics being the most frequent 
intruder.  The primary risk here is that a scholar’s political commitments will 
trump his obligations as a scholar, leading him to undertake a project as an 
exercise in justifying a conclusion predetermined by ideology rather than 
beginning with a question and following an analysis wherever it leads.69  At 
 
acceptable to others; and as a rule none whatsoever is given.’” (quoting REBECCA GOLDSTEIN, THE 
MIND-BODY PROBLEM 202 (1983))). 
68. Paul Horwitz, “Evaluate Me!”: Conflicted Thoughts on Gatekeeping in Legal Scholarship’s 
New Age, 39 CONN. L. REV. CONNTEMPLATIONS 38, 51 (2007).  Others have made a similar point.  
Aviam Soifer characterizes the legal-academic Zietgeist as involving “a disturbing amount of ‘looking 
out for numero uno’” and being populated by people for whom “it seems the next logical step on some 
competitive escalator.”  Aviam Soifer, MuSings, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 20, 23 (1987).  Deborah Rhode 
observes the phenomenon as present in academia more broadly: 
Desires for recognition shape much human behavior, but they are particularly 
pronounced in American academic settings.  The nation’s competitive culture 
reinforces a preoccupation with rankings.  And higher education attracts 
individuals with especially strong needs for achievement.  Those who end up in 
faculty and administrative leadership positions are individuals who, by definition, 
have done well in competitive educational settings and who value the form of 
recognition that academic reward structures provide.  By the same token, once 
these high achievers become academics, their status is in part derivative; their 
standing depends to some extent on the prestige of their employers. 
RHODE, supra note 60, at 6. 
69. FISH, supra note 7, at 18–19. 
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that point, on most accounts, the work no longer merits the label 
“scholarship.”70  But one can also imagine a quest for some degree of public 
recognition or even fame influencing a scholar in undesirable ways.  He may 
offer opinions in a form likely to be more palatable to the media or to generate 
greater public interest.  He may offer opinions on topics as to which he is 
unqualified to speak.  He would, in other words, offer conclusions not the 
product of a scholar’s methods. 
All of this places scholars in a position akin to that of judges.  Judicial 
independence is analogous to academic freedom,71 and neither is a one-sided 
coin.  Judicial independence is designed to free judges from the ill effects of 
only certain influences and relationships.72  It is a freedom created not for its 
own sake or to allow judges to do whatever they like, but instead to enable 
judges to follow the requirements of the law according to their best 
understanding.  Most accounts of academic freedom likewise do not regard it 
as a license to speak and write free of all constraints.73  It is instead a freedom 
designed to enable scholars to fulfill their responsibilities, chiefly to the 
scholarly pursuit of truth.  As Wayne Batchis observes, this freedom “is a 
double-edged-sword”: 
It can promote impartiality by acting as a shield from 
inappropriate external influences—but it can also create the 
impression of raw political opportunism.  It would be folly to 
dismiss the profound value of carefully designed institutional 
structures that self-consciously frame human behavior—
selectively releasing individuals, for admirable ends, from the 
rules of the game.74 
Maintaining the balance between freedom and responsibility is tricky.  For 
judges, the challenge becomes how best to situate them within a context of 
institutions and procedures that channel their decision-making so as to 
minimize a cluster of potentially improper influences including, among other 
things, politics, positioning oneself for promotion or reelection, the approval of 
one’s social peers, psychological biases, and so on.75  This task is made even 
 
70. “In the debates about academic freedom, one point goes largely uncontroverted.  Inquiry the 
conclusion of which is ordained before it begins is not academic; it is something else, and because it is 
something else it does not deserve the protection of academic freedom.”  Id. at 18. 
71. See generally Wayne Batchis, Academic Freedom and Judicial Independence, 9 FIU L. REV. 
35 (2013). 
72. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by “Judicial Independence”?, 64 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 323, 326–327 (2003). 
73. See FISH, supra note 7, at 110–11. 
74. Batchis, supra note 71, at 36. 
75. See Chad M. Oldfather, Aesthetic Judging, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
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more difficult because the line separating proper from improper influences is 
hazy and contested.  For example, a judge should not act as a partisan politician 
would, but that is not to say that a judge in her decision-making must or even 
can act entirely free of influences that overlap with and could plausibly be 
characterized as political in nature.76  A desire for promotion or reelection could 
sometimes lead a judge to decide in ways that we might regard as improper 
because they involve reaching a decision designed to appeal to the electorate or 
those responsible for selection.  It perhaps more often serves as a source of 
restraint, pushing judges more toward more moderate positions.  Because law 
is ultimately a reflection of society’s norms, a more moderate judicial decision 
is, in the typical case, more likely to be congruent with those norms and 
therefore with law.  The legal system uses a variety of mechanisms to shape the 
balance, including multimember courts, ethics rules, and the expectation that 
significant decisions will be justified in writing. 
The scholar’s mission is perhaps as easy to state, and as difficult to pin 
down in its particulars, as the judge’s.  The judge’s obligation is to the law, and 
the scholar’s is to sincere pursuit of the truth and, derivatively, to the 
knowledge-production function of the university.  These obligations stand in 
tension.  A scholar’s responsibility to produce knowledge almost certainly 
entails some sort of obligation to be mindful of his impact.  But as soon as he 
begins to focus on building an audience he finds himself subject to forces that 
pull away from the pursuit of truth.  Building an audience—whether through 
networking or other overt means of doing so, or simply by writing one’s 
scholarship in a manner mindful of its marketability—involves taking the target 
audience’s preferences into account.  That’s a positive feature when it leads 
scholars to be more attentive to disciplinary norms.  It takes on a negative cast 
when it diverts efforts toward more crassly instrumental means of drawing 
attention.  The conditions of judicial employment are designed to largely 
eliminate competition over salary and title, while scholars compete over these 
and more.77  Within the legal academy, as Dan Farber has (in my view) 
persuasively argued, the incentives are toward cleverness and a superficial form 
of brilliance, which is largely regrettable due to the nature of law itself, in which 
counterintuitiveness is considerably more of a bug than a feature.78   
 
76. Id. 
77. See RHODE, supra note 60, at 11 (“Even well-established faculty find it difficult to escape 
the sometimes toxic effects of intellectual hierarchies.  In a world in which financial compensation and 
opportunities for advancement are highly constrained, smaller emblems of status become increasingly 
critical.  Awards, speaking invitations, titles, publications in prominent journals, and references by 
scholars and media commentators all become coveted signals of success.”). 
78. Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1985). 
 
OLDFATHER 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/18  10:08 AM 
976 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:957 
As one attempts to exercise influence outside the academy the danger tends 
more toward politics as a corrupting influence.  External users of scholarship 
will have instrumental aims—winning a case, or scoring a political point—that 
do not require that they be sincere in their argumentation, and that are thus 
inconsistent with the scholar’s truth-seeking mission.79  The scholar will have 
to account for the strategic ways in which advocates will use his work, and if 
he does not succumb to the temptation to be strategic himself he is at least likely 
to alter the nature of his work in anticipation of the ways it will be used.80  This, 
in turn, has the potential to make a scholar’s utterances insincere, and thus to 
threaten their status as scholarship.81 
We thus come back to the parallel between the scholar and the artist.  Just 
as the artist faces the opposed forces of an obligation to the Truth of Art and, at 
the extreme, the need to eat, so, too, the scholar confronts an obligation to truth 
that stands in tension with a desire to compete for spoils with his peers and 
exercise influence inside and outside of the academy.  Likewise, in both 
contexts, there is a sense that work done for hire does not represent the best of 
the form.82  The scholar’s dilemma, as contrasted with the artist’s, has received 
comparatively little attention.  But consider, in addition to those raised at the 
outset, the questions a scholar must confront, assuming she possesses some core 
motivation to pursue truth.  Should she allow things other than her best 
conception of what is interesting and important according to her own lights and 
her best understanding of disciplinary norms to influence her selection of 
topics, or her analyses?  May she, for example, avoid certain topics and lines of 
argument based on a belief that to do so would be to her advantage given the 
internal politics of her discipline?  Is it proper for her to take advantage of ways 
in which she expects the community or individuals within it will reward her for 
behavior that is independent of, and perhaps inconsistent with, its scholarly 
norms?  There are various ways in which an academic might network her way 
to conference invitations and the like that are more a product of friendship or 
name-recognition than scholarly merit.  And there are various unsavory 
 
79. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory and Its 
Audience, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 569, 581 (1992). 
80. Id. at 586–88. 
81. Id. at 587–88.  Cf. Soifer, supra note 68, at 24 (“But I have a hunch that if you play it safe, 
you will find that even the significant achievement of tenure may turn out to be another Pyrrhic victory 
in the long line of empty successes our skepticism teaches us to recognize.”). 
82. See HYDE, supra note 34, at 100 (noting that in both science and literature work that is 
done for compensation is held in less esteem). 
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practices associated with the law review system that are designed to secure 
prominent placements independent of an article’s underlying merit.83 
Some of these, at least, are difficult questions, and it may not be possible to 
resolve them except by resort to intuitive moral judgments.  All of them, it 
seems to me, involve situations in which there is the potential for the scholar to 
be diverted away from the sincere pursuit of a scholarly mission.  My desire to 
get a good placement or a conference invitation or some other form of gold star 
can lead me to act in ways that are inconsistent with what I might do or say 
were I free of such influences.  Taken to an extreme—the bribery of a law 
review board or hiring committee, for example—resort to extra-scholarly 
efforts is clearly improper.  Beyond that we may be able to agree only that what 
I have identified are potentially negative influences, and that there are judgment 
calls involved in determining when the line is crossed. 
My intuition is that anything that enhances the scholar’s orientation toward 
sincerity and truth-seeking ought to be celebrated, and anything that diverts or 
corrupts that orientation ought to be viewed with skepticism if not hostility.  
There is undoubtedly a practical difficulty here, since it will often be difficult 
for an observer to distinguish legitimate efforts to appeal to disciplinary norms 
from self-serving behavior designed to build a reputation based on non-
scholarly considerations, and for non-scholarly gain, especially given the 
boundaries of what counts as legitimate scholarly considerations.  But having a 
disdain for such behavior be included among the set of disciplinary norms 
seems unquestionably valuable, even if its impact will be diffused and difficult 
to measure.84 
I stand, then, with Emerson in holding “Man Thinking”85 as the scholarly 
ideal, and in believing that, “[i]n the degenerate state, when the victim of 
society, he tends to become a mere thinker, or, still worse, the parrot of other 
men’s thinking.”86  The scholar may—indeed, must—be externally oriented, 
 
83. See, e.g., Ryan Scoville, The Ethics of Baiting and Switching in Law Review Submissions, 
101 MARQ. L. REV. 1075 (2018). 
84. Others have remarked on the consequences of status-oriented behavior for the quality of the 
scholarship it incentivizes:  
When there is a marked competition for jobs and money, when such supposedly 
secondary goals become primary, more and more scientists will be pulled into the 
race to hurry “original” work into print, no matter how extraneous to the wider 
goals of the community.  (In the literary community, at least in the last few 
decades, the need to secure a job has certainly accounted for a fair amount of the 
useless material that’s been published, both as literature and as criticism.)  
HYDE, supra note 34, at 108. 
85. But not, of course, insofar as the reference is a gendered one. 
86. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 54. 
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but her goal should be to bend her audiences to her way of thinking, rather than 
to have her way of thinking shaped by her audiences. 
How, then, should the scholar orient himself?  There are three natural points 
at which we might measure the whole of a scholar’s accomplishments, and thus 
three time horizons by which a scholar might calibrate her efforts.  The first is 
at the present moment, the second at her death, and the third at the point at 
which her words and her work have finally ceased to have any influence in the 
world.  None of these can be assessed with any sort of precision.  My 
contention, which I believe to be consistent with the ideal of the scholarly 
vocation (but which I concede may ultimately stand on an emotivist base), is 
that the proper scholarly aim is for the latter of these measures.  It is with her 
eye on the most distant horizon that the scholar is most likely to pursue truth, 
and least likely to be influenced by extraneous considerations. 
Do not take me the wrong way.  I am not suggesting that maximizing the 
impact of one’s work over the long term is necessarily incompatible with 
attention to the short term.  Cultivating an audience now certainly increases the 
probability of having one later on.  But the potential for conflict is greater, and 
the temptations toward the various spoils associated with the maximization of 
short-term influence can be counter-productive to the longer-term goals.  The 
person seeking short-term prominence will tend to focus on the problems of the 
day, and will be more susceptible to influence by the prejudices of the day.  As 
the issues change and one set of prejudices gives way to another, the scholar 
oriented toward immediate gratification stands a lesser likelihood of having an 
enduring influence. 
Nor am I suggesting that the scholar limit herself to esoterica or abstraction.  
For legal scholars especially there is a strong argument to the contrary.  
Appropriately crafted doctrinal scholarship can satisfy the knowledge-
production aims of the enterprise and influence generations of judges, lawyers, 
and students.  It can be undertaken with a scholarly mindset using a scholar’s 
methods, and it can produce work of great value to society.  Appropriately 
focused efforts related to teaching, including perhaps especially the creation of 
teaching materials, can likewise have a broad and enduring influence.  
Academics enjoy a privileged position.  For many, tenure provides freedom 
from the need to worry about how to pay the rent87 or whether there will be 
drastic professional consequences of choices to pursue certain lines of inquiry.  
 
87. Cf. HYDE, supra note 34, at xviii (“For some years now I myself have tried to make my way 
as a poet, a translator, and a sort of ‘scholar without institution.’  Inevitably the money question comes 
up; labors such as mine are notoriously non-remunerative, and the landlord is not interested in your 
book of translations the day the rent falls due.”). 
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Tenure likewise provides the luxury of time, and universities an abundance of 
scholarly resources, which combine to create a climate uniquely conducive to 
exhaustive research and deep reflection.  A sense of responsibility to the office 
might therefore be itself a sufficient source of motivation.88  But that freedom 
is so great, of course, that some exercise it to withdraw entirely from their 
responsibility to produce scholarship.  The reasons for that, one suspects, often 
have something to do with motivation, and its diminishment, and perhaps the 
absence of the right sort of motivation in the first instance. 
The answers to the questions I have raised do not have everything to do 
with motivation.  But they surely have something to do with motivation, and 
my instinct is that they have a great deal to do with motivation.  Legal 
academics, in particular, are fortunate not to face a choice so stark as that 
between the Truth of Art and hunger, nor do we, generally speaking, face 
pressures to secure external funding.  It is a position of great privilege, and great 
freedom—as well as great responsibility.  In the end, then, I join Deborah 
Rhode, Gary Marx, and Mark Rothko in urging scholars to value the process of 
engaging in their craft, of combining “playfulness of mind” with “a truly fierce 
drive to make sense of the world.”89  This does not entail relinquishing 
ambition, whether for a spot on the same shelf as Aristotle and Kant or for 
something less grandiose.  It is instead to feel with Jason Isbell the need to say 
something,90 to be with George Orwell “driven on by some demon whom one 
can neither resist nor understand,”91 and to hold fast with Kris Kristofferson in 
refusing to believe—regardless of whether anyone is paying attention at that 
moment—that no one wants to know.92 
 
 
88. See Yale Kamisar, Why I Write (And Why I Think Law Professors Generally Should Write), 
41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1747, 1756 (2004). 
89. MILLS, supra note 39, at 211. 
90. See Editors of GQ Style, supra note 2. 
91. ORWELL, supra note 18, at 320. 
92. KRISTOFFERSON, supra note 15. 
